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Abstract
In this paper we develop a stochastic model for household liquidity. In the model,
the optimal liquidity policy takes the form of a liquidity range. Subsequently,
we use the model to calibrate the upper bound of the predicted liquidity range.
Equipped with knowledge about the relevant control barriers, we run a series of
empirical tests on a panel data set of Dutch households covering the period 1992-
2007. The results broadly validate our theoretical predictions that households i)
exhaust most of their short-term liquid assets prior to increasing net debt, and
ii) reduce outstanding net debt at the optimally selected upper liquidity barrier.
However, a small minority of households appears to act sub-optimally. Poor
and vulnerable households rely too frequently on expensive forms of credit (such
as overdrafts) hereby incurring substantial amounts of fees and fixed borrowing
costs. Elderly households and people on social benefits tend to accumulate too
much liquidity. Finally, some households take on expensive short-term credit
while having substantial amounts of low-yielding liquid assets.
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1 Introduction
Recent survey evidence by Meleis and Israel (2010) suggests that many US consumers
feel that their financial affairs are simply out of control. A typical family uses checks,
debit cards, credit cards, multiple accounts, automated teller machines and automated
clearing house transactions. Spending is harder to control than ever before because
multiple household members write checks and make debit card purchases against the
same account, increasing the risk of overdrafts. For a typical household the volume
of transactions has doubled over the last few decades, and “so great is the concern
about juggling monthly payments and avoiding overdrafts that many US households are
now trapped into a compulsive routine of electronically verifying their account balances,
often 30 to 50 times per month.” These are, according to Meleis and Israel (2010),
“symptoms of a much larger problem, which is cash management”.
The recent economic crisis has exposed the gravity of the problem and the US gov-
ernment has recently issued a raft of legislation in order to protect consumers. For
example, in November 2009 the Federal Reserve Board issued amendments to “Regu-
lation E” that prohibit financial institutions from charging customers fees for paying
overdrafts on ATM and one-time debit card transactions that overdraw a consumer’s
account, unless a consumer consents or opts in to be charged a fee for these type of
transactions.1
In a similar vein Chairman Ben Bernanke of the Federal Reserve announced in
December 2008 revised rules concerning credit cards that “represent the most com-
prehensive and sweeping reforms ever adopted by the Board for credit card accounts.
These protections will allow consumers to access credit on terms that are fair and more
easily understood... Consumers must understand the pricing of credit card services if
they are to make well informed, responsible decisions about the use of credit and the
management of their accounts”.
While these facts and quotes illustrate the importance of the household cash man-
agement problem, one must be cautious not to generalise. Households are not a ho-
mogenous group and the majority of households do not face serious problems. For
example, a November 2008 FDIC study of Bank Overdraft Programs in the US found
that 74% of consumers do not incur overdraft fees, 12% of consumers are infrequent
overdraft users, 9% are moderate users and 5% are considered heavy overdraft users.
The average annual fee amount incurred by heavy users is $1610. The study shows
that a small minority of households pay the bulk of overdraft fees charged by banks.
1The Electronic Fund Act was passed by US Congress in 1978 to establish the rights and liabilities
of consumers as well as the responsibilities of all participants in electronic fund transfer activities.
The act was implemented in Federal Reserve Board “Regulation E”.
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The nonprofit Center for Responsible Lending (CRL) says that those with frequently
overdrawn accounts are among the most financially vulnerable as they tend to be lower
income, single, non-white and rent their homes. The CRL also labels overdrafts as “the
highest cost credit banks offer” and accuses some banks from engaging in unfair strate-
gies in order to maximise income from overdraft charges as evidenced by a recent court
ruling against Wells Fargo (Newsweek, August 13, 2010).2
Given the high charges for overdrafts, credit cards or credit offered by retailers, one
might wonder why some consumers use these forms of credit and do not rely on cheaper
financing sources. One possible explanation is that some households make decisions
that are sub-optimal from a financial viewpoint. Campbell (2006) claims that “many
households invest effectively, but a minority make significant mistakes”. According to
Campbell (2006) this minority appears to be poorer and less well educated.3
Despite it apparent importance, the existing household finance literature has largely
ignored the study of household cash management, and household liquidity more gener-
ally. Instead the focus has primarily been on the decision of the optimal composition of
the financial investments of the household, the efficiency of household portfolios, and
the role of diversification (see Campbell (2006)).4 In this paper we aim to address this
gap by analysing the dynamics of household liquidity, and the implications of these
dynamics for the financing decisions of households. In the concluding section we also
discuss the implications of our results for the policies and strategies of lenders and
financial regulators.
Households hold cash and other liquid assets for two main motives (Keynes (1936)):
a transaction motive and a precautionary motive. In the latter case cash holdings have
the function of a “safety net”, whereas in the former case cash allows for the smooth
execution of everyday financial transactions.
The determination of optimal cash and liquid asset levels has been analysed in the
literature as the balancing of two main driving forces – the benefits and the costs of
holding these assets – and the existing literature relies mostly on inventory optimisation
approaches. According to these models, cash must be held up to the level where
the marginal benefits of liquid holdings equal the marginal costs. Santomero (1974)
develops a general model of the demand for liquid assets by households, considering
different short-term assets and specific rates of return and transaction costs for each
2In August 2010 a federal judge in California ordered Wells Fargo to pay $230 million to consumers
in the state who overdrafted after the bank engaged in “high-to-low resequencing”, recording debt
transactions from highest amount to lowest, triggering multiple charges.
3The mistakes come in a variety of forms such as nonparticipation in risky asset markets, under-
diversification of risky portfolios, and failure to exercise options to refinance.
4For a detailed analysis of household portfolios (focused on asset allocation) and for an international
comparison see Guiso, Haliassos, and Jappelli (2002).
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asset type. His model, the first derived for household liquid assets, was inspired by the
works of Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956), and by the works of Miller and Orr (1966)
and Whalen (1965) focusing on firm demand for money under uncertainty. Unlike our
paper, Santomero (1974) does not focus on an empirical linkage between the household
liquid asset holdings and its characteristics.
More recently, Eisfeldt (2007) analyses the demand for liquid assets arising from
consumption smoothing purposes. Bolton and Rosenthal (2005) bring together a se-
lection of papers most of which argue that many poor people live where traditional
banking is not an option. This makes poor people susceptible to largely unregulated
fringe banks and businesses that charge credit-starved borrowers high interest rates,
fees and penalties. Agarwal et al. (2005) study whether consumers choose the right
credit contracts. They find that on average consumers chose the contract that ex post
minimised their net costs. However, a small minority of consumers persists in hold-
ing substantially sub-optimal contracts without switching. Zinman (2007) shows that
many households borrow on credit cards at high rates while holding low-yielding bank
account balances. While some of this may be due to irrational behaviour Zinman ar-
gues that the puzzle can largely be explained by the fact that bank deposits are more
liquid and therefore have an implicit value. For example, many household expenditures
(such as utility bills, home repairs and loan repayments) cannot be executed through
credit cards. Finally, Stango and Zinman (2009) examine what people actually pay
to use their checking and credit card accounts. They find that the median household
pays $500 per year and could avoid more than half these costs with minor changes in
behaviour.5
We develop a household liquidity model that attempts rationally to explain house-
hold liquidity management. Under the optimal liquidity policy, households do not
take any debt before internal funds are fully exhausted. When liquidity is exhausted
households increase net debt (by borrowing or liquidating long-term financial assets)
to restore liquidity to a strictly positive level. The optimality of a discrete increase in
liquidity results from the fixed costs (such as fees or fixed transaction costs) associated
with increasing net debt. If liquidity exceeds some upper threshold then it is optimal
for the household to decrease net debt (by investing in long-term illiquid assets, or by
paying off debt) by a discrete amount to some optimal interior liquidity level.
The objective of our paper is twofold. First, our model provides an empirical
framework that allows quantifying certain parameters of liquidity decisions, such as
(perceived) transaction costs of reducing or increasing net debt. Upon estimating
5Our paper can also be viewed as complementary to the empirical contributions on corporate cash
holdings (such as Kim, Mauer, and Sherman (1998), Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999),
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), and Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009)).
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our empirical model using a panel data set of Dutch households covering the period
1992-2007, we are able to assess the significance of these parameters by inferring the
shape of the underlying distribution of the households’ liquidity level and by identifying
lumpy changes in liquidity. The second purpose of our empirical tests is to establish
whether household demand for liquidity is indeed driven by the trade-off between the
interest forgone by holding low-yield short-term liquid assets and the costs of borrowing
or liquidating illiquid assets when the household runs out of short-term liquidity. The
alternative hypothesis is that household liquidity policy is determined by factors outside
the model, such as the inability to make optimal or fully rational financing decisions.
The answers to these research questions may have important policy implications for
regulators and lenders.
One limitation of our theoretical model is that it does not explicitly differenti-
ate between overdrafts and longer term debt, but instead pools the various classes of
debt together. Incorporating overdrafts would substantially complicate the theoretical
model.6 Furthermore, we will show that introducing overdraft balances into (a mod-
ified version) of the empirical model is not all that helpful in explaining household
liquidity for a number of reasons. First, only 7% of household-years include a positive
overdraft balance. Second, these overdrafts are to be attributed to a very small minor-
ity of households (87.38% of households in our sample never report an overdraft while
4.41% have an overdraft every year). It therefore appears that in the Netherlands (as
in the US) only a small group of households rely on overdrafts. Third, rather than
the amount of overdraft debt, what appears to be much more important for explaining
household liquidity is the mere presence of overdrafts (i.e. whether or not a household
has overdraft debt in the first place). In particular, our model for household liquidity
works well for households that do not use overdrafts but it appears to be inconsistent
with the liquidity policy of households that do have overdrafts. This suggests that the
presence of overdrafts is symptomatic of sub-optimal financing decisions. Analysing
the determinants of the probability of a household having an overdraft (using a probit
model) we find that high leverage, a large number of children, being unemployed or a
recipient of social benefits increases the likelihood of a household having an overdraft.
This suggests that poorer and more vulnerable households are more likely to follow
a suboptimal liquidity policy. In a similar vein, we find that elderly households and
those receiving social benefits appear not adequately to reduce their levels of net debt
when accumulating excess liquidity.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The derivation of the stochastic
liquidity model is presented in section 2. Section 3 contains the discussion of the
6Cash management models with overdrafts include Wirth (1984) and Bar-Ilan (1990).
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empirical methodology, whereas the data used is described in section 4. The results of
the empirical analysis are discussed in section 5. Finally, conclusions are presented in
section 6.
2 A simple model
Modelling household liquidity in all its complexity is a challenging task, particularly
if one wants to capture the interaction between liquidity and financial decisions. For
example, a household facing liquidity constraints might engage in additional part-
time employment or increase the number of hours in the current job. Our theoretical
model abstracts from such interactions and assumes that non-financial decisions are
independent of liquidity management decisions.
The model of liquidity management we present is inspired by the stochastic in-
ventory management literature, and by the works of Harrison and Taksar (1983) and
Harrison, Sellke, and Taylor (1983) on the control of Brownian motion. In our model,
the amount of liquid assets L held by a household follows (when not controlled) an
arithmetic Brownian motion:
dL = µdt+ σdzt, (1)
where µ is the drift rate, σ is the variance and dzt is a Wiener increment. The change
in the amount of liquid assets at each instant can be interpreted as the difference
between income and consumption.7 A household can make three types of liquidity
decisions. First, it can raise its level of net debt to increase the liquidity balance, L.
Second, it can reduce the level of net borrowing, which would lead to the reduction
of L. Finally, it can do nothing. The type of decision taken by a household results
from the following trade-off. On the one hand, holding liquidity is costly as short-term
liquid assets do not yield any interest, whereas long-term financial assets do. On the
other hand, liquidity serves as a safety cushion reducing the costs of future borrowing
or the costs if liquidating illiquid long-term assets.
Denote the household’s subjective discount rate by δ. The household faces a market
interest rate r, which applies to both borrowing and investment in long-term illiquid
financial assets (lending). This assumption implies that investment in long-term fi-
nancial assets is equivalent to negative debt and, as a result, it is the amount of net
7Consequently, the process (1) reflects a situation in which income realizations at each instant t
are normally and independently distributed and consumption is either constant, proportional to the
magnitude of the income shock at t or, in general, normally distributed as well. In such a case, the
resulting increments of liquidity are normally and independently distributed too and the (accumulated)
liquidity follows an arithmetic Brownian motion. A detailed description of a possible framework and
set of assumptions leading to equation (1) is presented in Appendix A.
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debt that matters. The fixed cost of increasing net debt (by issuing loans or liquidat-
ing long-term financial assets) is K (≥ 0).8 The amount of borrowing, L∗, is selected
optimally as a result of the tradeoff between its cost, L
∗r
δ
+K, and its benefit, which is
the reduction in the present value of the cost of any subsequent increases in net debt.9
Obviously, when K = 0, a household would just increase net debt infinitesimally every
time liquidity is exhausted to avoid the costs of forgone interest. (For r = 0 and K > 0,
the optimal amount of borrowing would be infinite.)
If the liquidity level is sufficiently high, a household may find it optimal to reduce the
level of net debt (which is equivalent to investing excess funds in long-term financial
assets or repaying existing debt). The associated fixed cost of such a reduction is
M ≥ 0. Consequently, each time the liquidity level hits upper barrier L, a household
optimally reduces it to the optimal target level L∗ < L.10 If there is no fixed cost of
reducing the level of net debt (i.e., if M = 0), then a household with excess cash makes
no discrete changes in its liquidity level and uses only the amount in excess of the
upper level L to reduce net debt.11 Moreover, no investment in long-term financial nor
debt repayment is ever made for r = 0. Figure 1 presents a graphical representation of
the liquidity management policy considered.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
A strictly positive sum of (K + M) is a necessary condition for holding liquidity
and for the policy analysed in this section to be non-degenerate. A strictly positive
interest rate precludes the existence of the trivial optimal policy of borrowing an infinite
amount in order to avoid the fixed cost of future external financing rounds and ensures
that reducing net debt is optimal for a sufficiently high level of liquidity.
8We implicitly assume that loans and long-term financial assets are identical in terms of their
return, r, and transaction costs, K. This assumption may not strictly hold in reality, but is adopted
to keep the model tractable.
9As there is no instantaneous convenience yield of holding liquidity, nor a time lag between the
decision to borrow and the receipt of funds, the household does not optimally borrow until liquidity
is fully exhausted. If we allowed for a time lag between the decision to borrow and the receipt of
funds, borrowing would optimally take place for a strictly positive liquidity level. To find this level,
we would have to specify a penalty associated with letting liquidity drop down to zero. Moreover,
the model itself would become much less tractable without providing obvious additional insights. In
the empirical part of the analysis, a strictly positive lower liquidity barrier would result in lower slope
coefficients.
10Since the borrowing and lending rates are the same, liquidity is always reset to the same level
irrespective whether resetting results from new borrowing or lending, see Harrison (1985).
11In such a case, barriers L and L∗ coincide.
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The value of liquidity from a household’s perspective, F (L), is equal to the difference
of the present values of the interest on (net) long-term assets and the transaction costs
discounted at a rate δ. Given liquidity dynamics (1), the value of liquidity can be
derived using standard dynamic programming techniques (see, e.g., Dixit (1993)). In
general, F (L) is given by
F (L) = A1e
β1L + A2e
β2L, (2)
where A1 and A2 are constants to be determined. Parameters β1 and β2 are the negative
and positive root, respectively, of the following equation:
δ − µx− 1
2
σ2x2 = 0. (3)
Consequently, the liquidity management problem boils down to finding barriers L∗
and L and constants A1 and A2 using the following system of boundary conditions for
F (L):
















The value-matching condition (4) requires that the difference between the value of
liquidity at L∗ and zero be exactly equal to the total cost of restoring liquidity to L∗
(from the zero level). Condition (5) requires that the value of liquidity at the target
level L∗ be smaller than the value at barrier L exactly by the amount equal to the gain




, net of the fixed transaction cost, M). Equations (6) and (7)
are smooth-pasting conditions ensuring the optimality of the barriers. Consequently,
at each of the barriers the marginal benefit of changing the liquidity level (represented




The value of liquidity, F (L) can be represented as the following function of the
model parameters as well as of barriers L and L∗:













where Θ(0, L;L) and Θ(0, L;L), defined in Appendix B, are annuity-like factors rep-
resenting the present value of a series of e1 payments received each time threshold
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L is hit or liquidity is exhausted, respectively. The first component of (8) represents
the present value of interest on (gross) long-term assets minus the associated transac-
tion costs, whereas the second component equals the present value of interest paid on
(gross) debt, including transaction costs. For a graphical illustration of the value of
liquidity F (L), see Figure 2.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
The figure shows that for low liquidity levels (L ∈ [0, L∗)) the marginal value
of liquidity exceeds r
δ
. For high liquidity levels (L ∈ (L∗, L)) the marginal value of
liquidity is less than r
δ
. At L∗ and L the marginal value of liquidity equals exactly r
δ
.
For example, if the household’s discount rate, δ, equals the market discount rate, r,
then the marginal value of e1 of liquidity equals 1 at L∗ and L.
3 Empirical methodology
Households’ incremental financing decisions depend on their current liquidity level in
the interval (0, L). For example, upon exhausting liquidity (L = 0) the marginal benefit
of creating financial slack exceeds the marginal cost of external financing (F ′(L) > r
δ
).
In such a case, a household would increase its level of net debt by a strictly positive
amount K + L∗, up to the point at which the marginal benefit and the marginal cost
are equal. (The discrete jump in liquidity results from a strictly positive fixed cost K.)
On the other hand, upon hitting the threshold L, the liquidity level is reduced until
the marginal benefit of holding liquidity is as high as the marginal benefit of reducing
net debt (F ′(L) < r
δ
for L ∈ (L∗, L)). As a result, the level of L is reset from L to L∗.
Following the discussion in the previous section, household i pursues the following
financing policy: i) it increases net debt as soon as liquidity is exhausted so that the
amount of liquidity is restored to a positive level L∗, ii) it reduces net debt when
liquidity rises above the upper trigger, L, which results in depleting liquidity to level
L∗, and iii) it takes no action when the level of liquidity is between 0 and L.
In the remainder of the section we develop the empirical analysis based on the
model of section 2 in three stages. First, we derive the functional form of the stationary
distribution of the household liquidity level. Second, we run a regression model of the
determinants of liquidity to estimate for each household the average level of liquidity.
Finally, we use those estimated values to test whether incremental liquidity decisions
of households are consistent with our model.
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3.1 Application of the stochastic liquidity model
As we are dealing with a large cross-section of households but with a very limited time-
series dimension, we are unable to estimate the model for each household separately.
Therefore, we assume that all households pursue the same liquidity policy up to a
proportionality constant. In other words, a household with an average level of liquidity
equal to, say, e2,000 starts reducing net debt at the liquidity level twice as high (or,
borrows twice as much upon exhausting liquidity) as a household with an average
level of liquidity of e1,000. The average liquidity level E [Lit] is therefore used as
the scaling parameter. In such a framework, one can think of the set of parameters
(µ,K,M,L∗, L) as being scaled for each observation by E [Lit] and σ2 as being scaled
by (E [Lit])
2 (The variance parameter σ2it is denominated in e
2.) For instance, the ratio
of the upper liquidity threshold for household i at time t, and household j at time s
(Lit/Ljs), corresponds to the ratios of average liquidity levels, E [Lit] /E [Ljs].
Consequently, µit, Kit, Mit, L
∗
it and Lit are all denominated in currency units. For
example, parameter µit denotes the expected annual appreciation of the liquidity stock
if neither borrowing nor debt repayment occurs. Kit and Mit denote the lump-sum
costs of borrowing and debt repayment, respectively, while L∗it and Lit denote the
currency-denominated liquidity levels associated with the optimal liquidity policy of
household i in year t. Parameters µ, K, M , L∗ and L are therefore interpreted as
proportions of the average household liquidity level (e.g., if Kit = e100 and E [Lit] =
e1,000, then K = 0.1). Furthermore, the variance parameter of the liquidity process
(1), σ2, is interpreted as a fraction of the squared average household liquidity level.
Discount rate δ and interest rate r are the only parameters which are constant across
households.
The scalability property is very desirable since it allows us to derive the distribution
of the normalised liquidity, which is common for all the households. To do so, we
define lit ≡ Lit/E [Lit] as the normalised liquidity. As a consequence of the scalability
assumption, all observations lit are drawn from the same distribution, the shape of
which can be inferred based on the entire sample of households. The derivation of
the piece-wise exponential density function ϕ(l) of normalised liquidity is presented in
Appendix C (cf. Bertola and Caballero (1990) and Dixit (1993)). An example of such
a distribution is illustrated in Figure 3.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
What is directly relevant to our empirical test, is the relationship between l, l∗ and
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the mean of the distribution.12 This relationship directly depends on the magnitudes
of transaction costs associated with increases and reductions of net debt (K and M ,
respectively) as well as on such economic parameters as µ, r, δ and σ.13 Therefore,
once the inference is made about the shape of the distribution, we are able to draw
conclusions about the relative transaction costs consistent with the plausible values of
remaining model parameters.
Consequently, the empirical part of our study has three main objectives. First,
we test whether household’s liquidity policy generally follows the policy described in
section 2. Second, by allowing our model to detect discrete changes in the level of
liquid assets, we draw inferences about the relative locations of l, l∗ and the mean.
Finally, based on the inferred shape of the distribution and plausible values of remaining
economic parameters, we provide conclusions about the (perceived) magnitudes of the
transaction costs associated with changes in the level of net debt.
3.2 Estimation of the expected liquidity level
Estimation of the average liquidity level for each observation is done using regression
analysis. We calculate the predicted liquidity level for each household by regressing
liquidity on a number of explanatory variables for the entire sample.14 This predicted
value of liquidity is used as a scaling variable in the regression analysis in section 3.3.
If we were to interpret our model very narrowly, we would expect all the households
to be identical up to the proportionality constant. Therefore, a single variable related to
the wealth of a household, such as total assets, would be sufficient for determining the
average liquidity level.15 To avoid imposing such a restrictive framework, we assume
that the households pursue identical (up to the proportionality constant) liquidity
policies but otherwise are heterogenous. As a consequence, we are able to adopt a
more general model of the average liquidity level.
The determinants of the average liquidity level considered in our study are par-
tially inspired by the study of corporate cash holdings by Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and
Williamson (1999). Obviously, factors affecting households’ demand for liquidity differ
from those for firms. When deciding on the average level of cash holdings, families
consider mainly transaction and precautionary motives. Informational asymmetries
12l and l∗ denote the normalised values of Lit and L∗it, respectively.





14By doing so, we follow, among others, Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) and Rhodes-
Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005)
15Other household financial characteristics such as income or debt would have no additional ex-
planatory power as they would constitute the same proportion of total assets for each household.
Moreover, non-economic characteristics such as age or educations would play no role at all.
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are unlikely to influence households’ demand for liquidity as creditors can relatively
easily observe a household’s characteristics. Furthermore, no separation of ownership
and control arises, which makes predictions based on agency-theoretic models not rele-
vant. Still, we rely on such determinants of liquid asset holdings known from corporate
finance literature as the leverage ratio, size, and cash flow (income). In addition, we
supplement the set of explanatory variables with additional household-specific charac-
teristics, such as age and education.
Just as bigger firms have on average a higher demand for liquidity, wealthier house-
holds are likely to maintain higher cash amounts. However, as a proportion of total
assets these amounts may be lower, as the economy of scale argument is valid for both
the transaction and precautionary motives for holding liquidity. Also, household size
may proxy for the risk of financial distress or cash-flow uncertainty, and less wealthy
families are expected to hold proportionally more cash for precautionary motives. In-
deed, Opler et al. (1999) document a negative relation between firm size and cash
holdings as a proportion to total assets. This follows a prediction of the static tradeoff
theory of firm financing, where economies of scale in liquid assets exist and expected
bankruptcy costs are negatively related to firm size. Hence, size is expected to have a
positive but concave relation with the cash value of liquid assets.
Net income, the cash flow measure for households, holds an ambiguous relation
with liquidity. Like firms, households experiencing a positive cash-flow shock may be
expected to accumulate liquidity for a given predetermined expenditure (consumption)
and debt reduction plan. However, households may be more “debt” averse than firms.
Also, debt conveys fewer benefits to households than to firms (e.g., in terms of tax
shield benefits or agency cost reduction). Therefore, households may use any excess
income that could otherwise increase liquidity holdings to repay debt, even above the
normal repayment plan (cf. the income and substitution effect of cash flow shocks in
Riddick and Whited (2009)).
The demand for corporate liquidity increases with leverage, as companies with big
financial commitments have their access to new debt restricted and therefore need
more liquidity for precautionary motives. Similarly, if a family has high levels of
debt, access to new debt in troublesome periods may be extremely expensive, if not
impossible. Consequently, a higher level of liquidity holdings would be expected for
highly indebted households. However, the higher demand may not be reflected in
higher observed liquidity levels, as these families may face liquidity constraints, due to
tight debt repayment schedules. As a result, observed liquidity levels may be below
what would be predicted by demand. Therefore, the sign of the relationship between
the leverage ratio and average liquidity is ex ante ambiguous.
The other two determinants of household liquidity that we consider are age and
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education. The preferred level of liquid assets varies over the life cycle. People of
different ages have different perceptions of the amount of liquidity they require to
proceed with their daily economic activities, and the level of liquidity required as a
“safety net”. For example, pensioners and older people tend to be more cautious.
Hence, these individuals are expected to keep higher amounts in liquid assets held for
precautionary motives. Furthermore, most debt is paid off by later age, providing more
scope for liquidity to build up. Therefore, a positive relation between age and liquidity
is expected.
Education has a major influence on the way individuals develop their financial
choices, and thus should be considered in an empirical test of the determinants of
household liquidity. Higher educated individuals are typically subject to less risky fi-
nancial situations, and lower income uncertainty. Considering this argument, education
would have a negative expected relation with cash holdings. However, other factors
may also play a role. Highly educated people may be more risk averse (or, financially
aware), and face lower financing constraints. In such a case, they would be expected
to build up liquidity to its optimal (higher) level.16
Finally, we control for five other factors directly associated with households’ as-
sets and wealth. To take into account a potentially higher risk aversion of retired
individuals, we use an additional dummy to represent those households that receive a
pension. One of the major goals of most households is a house tenure. Hence, prior
to purchasing a house, liquidity accumulation is likely to occur (so that a substantial
initial down-payment on the home can be accumulated). Therefore, we include home
ownership and mortgage debt as explanatory variables. To take into account the pre-
dictability (and expectation) of the income flow, we include two additional dummies
for employment and self-employment.
The basic empirical model of the determinants of expected household liquidity is
therefore as follows:17
E [Lit] = γˆ0 + γˆ1SIZEit + γˆ2INCit + γˆ3LEVit (9)
+γˆ4AGEit + γˆ5EDUit,
where E [Lit] is the expected liquidity (defined below), SIZEit is the natural logarithm
of total assets, INCit is the household’s total net income, LEVit is the ratio of total
debt to total assets, AGEit is the age of the eldest person in the household, and EDUit
16Tong (2010) analyses the relation between risk attitude and cash holdings using US firm data.
17The standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the household level to deal with multiple
observations for the same household in different years. Since nearly 50% of households are observed
only once, the fixed-effects/random-effects estimators are not a viable alternative (as their use would
result in disregarding those observations).
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is a dummy variable equal to 1 for tertiary education, and 0 otherwise. Parameter
estimates γi, i ∈ {0, 1, ..., 5}, are obtained using an OLS regression specification. An
extension of the basic model includes three additional dummy variables: PENSIONit
– equal to 1 for pensioners, and 0 otherwise, OWNERit – equal to 1 for homeowners,
and 0 otherwise, MTGit – equal to 1 for mortgage holders, and 0 otherwise, EMPLit
– equal to 1 for employed individuals, and 0 otherwise, and SELFit – equal to 1 for
self-employed individuals, and 0 otherwise.
In the empirical specification we consider two different definitions of liquidity. The
narrower measure of liquidity, L
(0)
it , considers as liquid assets cash and checking ac-
counts. The broader measure, L
(1)
it , includes savings and deposit accounts in addition




3.3 A test of incremental financing decisions
Our test of incremental financing decisions resembles to a large extent the test of
the pecking order theory on corporations (Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), Frank
and Goyal (2003)). For firms, the test aims to identify which of the two sources of
external financing, debt and equity, is used in the first place. In a household finance
application, such an approach would be impossible to implement since equity is never
issued. Therefore, we aim to investigate the incremental financing decision by looking
at whether households finance their needs using primarily short-term liquid assets and
resort to long-term financial assets or borrowing if the former are exhausted.
First, define the deficit as −∆Wit, that is, the negative change in net worth (re-
sulting from a particular realization of transitory income). The balance sheet of a
household can be expressed as Wit +Bit = Sit +Lit, where Bit, Sit, and Lit denote the
levels of borrowing, long-term financial assets and liquidity, respectively. Changes in
net worth, −∆Wit, are observable via the balance sheet identity:
−∆Wit = ∆Bit − ∆Sit − ∆Lit
≡ ∆Dit − ∆Lit,
where ∆Dit is the change in net debt. According to our model, the deficit arising in
a given period is financed first with short-term liquid assets, −∆Lit, and – as they
become exhausted – with additional (net) debt, ∆Dit.
Therefore, we expect to observe the following piecewise-linear relationship between
incremental net debt and the deficit:19
18For details of all the variables included in each liquidity definition, as well as descriptives for the
sample, see Table 1.




0 −∆Wit < Li,t−1
−∆Wit − Li,t−1 −∆Wit ≥ Li,t−1.
(10)
This is equivalent to
−∆Lit =
{
−∆Wit −∆Wit < Li,t−1
Li,t−1 −∆Wit ≥ Li,t−1.
(11)
By observing that depleting short-term liquidity is preferred to increasing net debt,
the following formulation is used in the first test of the stochastic liquidity model:
−∆lit = ϑ − θ∆wit + ηit, (12)
where ϑ and θ are parameters to be estimated and ηit is the error term. Variables
−∆lit and −∆wit are defined as −∆Lit/E [Lit] and −∆Wit/E [Lit], respectively, as the
model is formulated in terms of normalised variables. The null hypothesis that the
entire deficit is covered by depleting short-term liquid assets is equivalent to ϑ = 0
and θ = 1. In other words, model (12) stipulates a euro-for-euro linear relationship
between financing needs and the use of short-term financial assets (see Figure 4, Panel
A). Obviously, such a formulation can be too restrictive as liquidity may eventually
be exhausted and a household may have to resort to debt financing or, equivalently in
our framework, to reducing the level of long-term financial assets. Consequently, (12)
can be viewed as a test of the liquidity model for households having sufficiently high
liquidity levels to cover any potential deficits.
One way of incorporating the possibility of exhausting liquidity is to allow θ to be
lower than 1 under the null hypothesis (cf. the “weak form” interpretation of financing
hierarchy in Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999)). However, there are some shortcomings
of such an approach (as pointed out first by Chirinko and Singha (2000)). A coefficient
smaller than one may indicate not only partial debt financing after depleting internal
cash but also financing of any deficit with some combination of liquid assets and changes
in net debt.
In order to overcome these problems, we design an alternative test of incremental
deficit financing decisions. The fact that we are testing the use of short-term liquid
assets versus net debt puts us in a comfortable position of being able to observe whether
short-term liquidity is exhausted or not (cf. panel B of Figure 4).20
20Our approach differs therefore substantially from the one adopted in corporate finance (as in
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003)). Corporate capital structure tests
consider debt versus equity. Since debt capacity is not observable it is not possible to determine when
firms have exhausted their capacity to borrow. In our test, which considers liquidity versus (net) debt
financing, we can observe when a household’s liquid assets have been exhausted.
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Consequently, our empirical formulation is of the following form:21
−∆lit − li,t−1 = ϑ+ θmin {−∆wit − li,t−1, 0}+ ηit, (13)
where li,t−1 is defined as Li,t−1/E [Lit]. In such a test, ϑ = 0 and θ = 1 would indicate
that only short-term liquid assets are used to finance deficits not exceeding li,t−1, and a
mix of liquidity (amounting to li,t−1) and net debt is used to finance deficits exceeding
the existing level of short-term liquid assets, li,t−1. Consequently, such a result would
support the one-sided case of the liquidity model with K = 0 and M → ∞ (i.e. no
fixed cost of increasing net debt and no possibility of reducing net debt).
A more flexible test of the incremental financing decision, which reflects the effective
debt requirement to finance larger deficits, is of the form:22
−∆lit − li,t−1 = ϑ+ θ1 (−∆wit − li,t−1) + θ2 max {−∆wit − li,t−1, 0}+ ηit. (14)
The null hypothesis of the special case of the liquidity model with K = 0 and M →∞,
is supported for ϑ = 0, θ1 = 1 and θ2 = −1. A value for θ2 = −1 corresponds to
the household increasing its net debt by −∆wit − li,t−1, which places liquidity back at
the predicted level. Compared to model (13), model (14) allows for an extra degree of
freedom as the slope of the relationship between the deficit and the change in liquid
assets is not restricted to zero for levels of deficit exceeding li,t−1 (see Panel C).
Apart from following the developed framework to normalise variables with E [Lit],
we have not made use of the results obtained in section 2. We need them for the
full-fledged test of incremental financing decisions. In such a test, an upper barrier l at
which households start reducing net debt is present. To accommodate this requirement,
we use a range of candidate values for l in the following test:
−∆lit − li,t−1 = ϑ+ θ0 min
{−∆wit − li,t−1 + l, 0}+ θ1 (−∆wit − li,t−1)
+θ2 max {−∆wit − li,t−1, 0}+ ηit. (15)
The upper bound of the distribution of normalised short-term liquid assets, l, is in
itself a function of the parameters of this distribution, such as the drift rate, volatil-
ity or transaction costs. As l cannot be obtained analytically, we perform extensive
simulations to determine its likely values for plausible parameter configurations. We
21The reason for shifting both the explained and the explanatory variable by li,t−1 results from
the need for the functional form of the empirical model to be independent from the household char-
acteristics (li,t−1 in this case). This shift is exactly what differentiates our approach from existing
contributions. To extend these other approaches in a similar fashion requires knowledge of debt
capacity.
22This test does not prevent the coefficient of the deficit to be different from zero even for the
incremental part of the deficit exceeding li,t−1.
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obtain that l in most cases falls into interval (1.5, 3.5). Therefore, we select l = 2 as
our base case. In addition, l = 2 appears to be a good benchmark as it is consistent
with a symmetric distribution of l. As an extension, we also perform a grid search for
the best model fit for l ∈ [1, 4] with a step size of 0.1.
Under specification (15), a kink at −∆wit = −l + li,t−1 is expected as a result of
the fact that any liquidity above the amount l is used to reduce the level of debt.
Therefore, for surpluses exceeding l− li,t−1, the marginal effect of an additional euro of
surplus should not have any effect on the level of short-term liquid assets as it will be
used to reduce net debt (in other words, the slope of the graph in Panel D is expected
to be zero to the left of −l + li,t−1). Consequently, we expect that θ0 = −1. Also, and
as before, we expect ϑ = 0, θ1 = 1 and θ2 = −1.
As a robustness check of (15), we perform an empirical test allowing for the slope
of the regression function for negative values of the explanatory variable −∆wit (which
correspond to households facing a surplus) to differ from the slope over the remaining
interval. The corresponding regression specification has the form
−∆lit − li,t−1 = ϑ+ θ0 min {−∆wit, 0}+ θ1 (−∆wit − li,t−1)
+θ2 max {−∆wit − li,t−1, 0}+ ηit, (16)
where we expect θ0 ∈ (−1, 0). The advantage of using specification (16) is that it does
not require knowledge of the upper barrier of liquidity, l, at which a household would
invest in long-term financial assets (make a debt repayment). Its downside is that it is
subject to the critique of Chirinko and Singha (2000) that a slope smaller (in absolute
terms) than one does not have an unambiguous interpretation (cf. Panel E).
Finally, to test for the presence of a fixed cost of increasing (K) and reducing net
debt (M), we allow for additional degrees of flexibility that capture the discontinuities
of the explained variable (see Panel F):
−∆lit − li,t−1 = ϑ+ θ0 min
{−∆wit − li,t−1 + l, 0}+ θ1 (−∆wit − li,t−1)
+θ2 max {−∆wit − li,t−1, 0}
+κ0D0,it + κ1D1,it + ηit. (17)
D0,it is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the surplus is sufficiently large to optimally
trigger a reduction in net debt (i.e., −∆wit < −l+ li,t−1) and 0 otherwise. Analogously,
D1,it is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the deficit is large enough to trigger additional
borrowing (i.e., −∆wit > li,t−1) and 0 otherwise. A positive value for κ0 (i.e., κ0 > 0)
and a negative value for κ1 (i.e., κ1 < 0) would indicate positive lump-sum costs of
debt reduction and borrowing, respectively. The expected absolute magnitudes of κ0
and κ1 equal the distance between the relevant resetting barrier and the target liquidity
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level (l − l∗ and l∗, respectively). In turn, distances l − l∗ and l∗ are monotonic in the
transaction cost parameters M and K, respectively.
4 Data
The data set used to empirically test our model is based on the DNB Household Survey
(DHS) carried out by CentERdata, a data collection unit of the Center for Economic
Research at Tilburg University (the Netherlands). The rotating panel follows yearly
over 2000 representative households in the Netherlands since 1993, and provides unique
information about the financing, spending, labor and social decisions of individual
households. The panel is constructed with the objective of reflecting the composition
of the Dutch population. Bi-annual refreshment samples are drawn with the main
objective of keeping the panel representative of the Dutch population. In the finance
literature, the data from the DNB survey has been used, among others, by Guiso,
Sapienza, and Zingales (2008).
The Netherlands is a particularly interesting country of study for household finance.
The Dutch financial system is relatively well developed, and Dutch households exhibit
a high level of financial sophistication and are sensitive to changes in the institutional
setting and to financial incentives potentially produced in their economic environment
(see Alessie, Hochguertel, and van Soest (2002)).
Since households are making decisions in an economic environment determined by
some features that are specific to the Netherlands (for example, one of the lowest rates
of home ownership in the EU, a tenant-friendly legal code or the proliferation of fixed
rate mortgages) one has to be careful in extrapolating the results to other countries.
However, considering that we are implementing an analysis of basic liquid assets, we
believe that many of our results also apply to other countries in Western Europe, such
as the United Kingdom.
Our data set corresponds to the period 1992–2007. All currency-denominated values
are expressed in euro (using the official NLG/e conversion rate of 2.20371). Obser-
vations considered are the ones in which all relevant parts of the questionnaire were
answered by household members. Families answering all parts of the questionnaire in
several years are considered as different observations. In our main regression studies,
potential correlation of these is considered by calculating robust standard errors.
The size of the data set that we use in the study is considerably smaller than the to-
tal number of observations in the DNB survey (in excess of 30,000). This is mainly due
to the requirement that several different sections of the questionnaire contain complete
answers in two consecutive years (needed for calculating changes in liquidity related
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variables). Furthermore, we removed from the sample households with leverage (de-
fined as the ratio of total debt to total assets) above 2. This leaves us with 9,957
observations that are used in regression (9) predicting the average liquidity level. An-
other restriction on the sample size follows from the fact that only households with
a positive estimated average liquidity level (based on regression (9)) are considered
in models (12)–(17), as variables in those models are scaled by the predicted average
liquidity level. As a result, we lose another 469 observations. Finally, to mitigate
the influence of extreme observations, the dataset was truncated. After ranking all
households with respect to −∆wit, the top and bottom 1% of households (that is, 189
observations corresponding to top deficits or top surpluses of funds) were removed from
the sample. The advantage of this procedure is the elimination of households observing
abnormal and sporadic situations in the household economic life, which lead to huge
deficits or surpluses. Examples of such events would be home acquisition or a large
inheritance. The procedure also eliminates the effect on the results of those households
for which the predicted liquidity level (the scaling variable) is very close to zero. The
final sample used in regressions (12)–(17) consists therefore of 9,299 observations.
4.1 Data on liquid assets
The DHS survey presents detailed data on household asset holdings, with a very thor-
ough categorization. Table 1 presents the main liquid asset categories, descriptives
for average liquid asset holdings in our sample, each asset category as a proportion of
total assets, and two definitions of liquidity used in the remainder of the paper. The
average household in our sample holds an average of e2,749 in short-term financial
assets: cash and checking accounts. Deposit books as well as savings accounts and
plans, comprising medium-term less liquid financial assets, account for 6.2% of total
household assets, and are on average e10,502. Both categories of financial assets add
up to our broader definition of liquidity, which has an average total value of e15,097
and corresponds on average to 7.6% of total household assets. Finally, long-term illiq-
uid financial assets, which primarily consist of investments in mutual funds, stocks and
bonds, have an average value of e12,212 and represent 6.1% of total household assets.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Also, for the 9,299 households considered in our liquid asset dynamics regressions,
and using the measure of liquidity L(1), we observe that 45.3% of households experience
a deficit of funds. Also, of these households in deficit, 45.4% hold enough liquid assets
to repay the deficit. For households with a surplus of funds, 12.8% have a total liquid
assets value above twice the estimated average liquidity level.
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5 Results
This section presents the results of the estimation of the average liquidity level E [Lit]
required for the testing of our proposed model (and implemented as in equation (9)),
and the tests of incremental financing decisions proposed in equations (12)–(17). Re-
sults are shown for the two definitions of liquid assets: the narrower definition, L
(0)
it ,
considering only cash and checking accounts; and the broader definition, L
(1)
it , consider-
ing the above plus deposit and savings accounts. In implementing regressions (12)–(17)
all variables are normalised by scaling the original values by the estimated average liq-
uidity level E [Lit]. In the base case, models (15) and (17) are estimated using l = 2 as
the upper boundary of the liquidity distribution. An extension based on other levels
of the upper barrier is also presented. We conclude the section with an analysis of the
characteristics of those households for which the fit of our theoretical model is much
worse.
5.1 Determinants of the average liquidity level





it ). Model 1 presents the results of the basic regression in (9), which
considers leverage, net income, household size, age and education as the explanatory
variables. Model 2 further explores the cross-sectional variation in the sample by
additionally including as determinants of liquidity such dummy variables as pensions,
home ownership, mortgage presence, employment and self-employment. The estimated
coefficients are mainly in line with our predictions.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Household size, proxied by the natural logarithm of total assets, has a positive and
highly significant relation with liquidity. The results are as predicted, since households
with higher gross assets are expected to hold higher amounts of liquidity.23 The coef-
ficient of net income also exhibits a positive sign, and is significant. Results indicate
that high income households finance their activities internally, repay due debt with
remaining funds, and accumulate liquidity afterwards. Finally, leverage has a negative
effect on the average liquidity level, which is a indication of financing constraints faced
by highly indebted households.
23If the ratio of liquidity to total assets – a relative measure – is the dependent variable, then
the estimated household size coefficient is, however, negative. This confirms the economies of scale
argument described in section 3.2.
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The prediction that households adopt higher liquidity levels as they move through
the life cycle is confirmed, with positive and significant coefficients observed for the
age factor. However, the age factor loses some magnitude in Model 2, possibly due
to the fact that some older people are pensioners, and age is capturing this effect in
Model 1. Also, although the education coefficient is negative, which could lead to the
conclusion that more educated households appear to hold less liquid assets, the results
are statistically significant only for liquidity definition L
(0)
it .
Regarding the additional variables present in Model 2, pensioners have significantly
higher amounts of liquidity. It is likely that higher risk aversion reduces them to hold
more liquidity for precautionary motives. Homeowner households, however, appear to
hold significantly less liquidity than non-homeowner households. This fact confirms the
process of liquid asset accumulation by renters, potentially with the ultimate objective
of a downpayment on a house. Mortgaged homeowner households seem to hold higher
levels of liquid assets than unmortgaged owner households. However, the effect is
not statistically significant. The employment dummy variable is positive and highly
significant for L
(1)
it but not for L
(0)
it . This indicates that employment status does not
affect the shortest-term liquid asset holdings. Finally, self-employment is a significant
positive determinant of L
(0)
it , but not of L
(1)
it .




it allow us not only to understand the
main factors driving liquid asset holding, but also to create an estimate of the average
liquidity level E [Lit] required to scale variables in (12)–(17). In the remainder of the
paper, estimates of E [Lit] are based on the results of Model 2.
5.2 Incremental financing decisions
The regression results for the incremental financing decisions by households are shown
in Tables 3 and 4, with Table 3 reporting results based on L
(0)
it and Table 4 those based
on L
(1)
it . The regression specifications become more flexible (in terms of degrees of
freedom) when moving to the right of each table and the results of these more flexible
models generally follow more closely the predictions of the theoretical model.
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here]
Regression results of the basic test of the preference of internal liquidity to external
financing as proposed in (12), and similar to the empirical test of the pecking order
theory proposed by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), give a slope coefficient of 0.009 for
L
(0)
it and and 0.098 for L
(1)
it and deviate from the predicted value of one for the coefficient
of −∆wit (using the 5% confidence intervals). In both cases, the intercept is close to the
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predicted value of zero (the difference is not significant at the 5% level). These results
appear to indicate only a partial external (debt) financing of the deficit of funds by
households. Several critiques of this basic test applied to corporate capital structure
(see Chirinko and Singha (2000)) also hold for our framework. Although suitable
for households with a very high level of liquid assets, this test leads to ambiguous
interpretations for the coefficients of the deficit variable (−∆wit) that are lower than
1.
In general, we expect a lower coefficient for the narrower definition of short-term
liquidity (L
(0)
it ) than for the broader definition of short-term and medium-term liquidity
(L
(1)
it ). This is due to the fact that larger deficits usually have to be financed by some
combination of liquidity and net debt. For any size of the deficit, the probability of
financing it entirely with short-term liquid assets (which is equivalent to the slope coef-
ficient being equal to 1) is lower than the probability of financing it with a combination
of short-term and medium-term assets.24
Equation (13) provides an alternative test of household behaviour in the presence
of a funds deficit. It explicitly takes into account the fact that net debt needs to be
increased once short-term liquid assets are exhausted. Since the available amount of
short-term assets is observable we know exactly when short-term liquidity is exhausted.
We obtain a slope coefficient of 0.017 for L
(0)
it and of 0.224 for L
(1)
it , which is in both cases
significantly different from 1 at the 5% level. The results of regression (13) suggest once
more that the financing of the arising deficits is being made through a combination of
liquid funds and an increase in net debt. The results suggest that net debt is increased
before existing liquid assets are fully exhausted. As expected, a greater share of the
deficit is funded by liquidity if we consider the definition L
(1)
it , compared to L
(0)
it where
households rely to a larger extent on net debt. Also, an accumulation of liquid assets
independent of the level of the deficit and its partial financing, appears to exist for
both liquidity definitions, as the estimated coefficient ϑ is negative and significant.
A more flexible test of incremental financing decisions is conducted using (14).
Results obtained are of a very similar magnitude to the ones just discussed. The
results confirm a partial reduction of liquidity by households in deficit prior to new
debt being issued as θ1 and θ2 exhibit some distance from the theoretically predicted
values of 1 and −1, respectively (they are equal to 0.017 and −0.018 for L(0)it and 0.228
and −0.249 for L(1)it , respectively). As before, results are much closer to the predicted
magnitudes if considering L
(1)
it , for which around a quarter of the available liquidity is
24As a robustness check, we have re-estimated equations (12)–(17) with observations corresponding
to the top and bottom 5, 10 and 25% of the normalised deficit level removed from the sample. As
expected, regression coefficients of the basic model specifications move closer to 1 if these extreme
observations are removed.
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exhausted before the level of net debt is increased.
In model (15), we introduce an upper barrier l at which households start repaying
debt (or investing in long-term assets) by using excess liquidity. Our candidate value
is 2 (see section 3.3). Empirical results partially confirm our theoretical predictions.
Namely, if L
(1)
it is considered, the estimated value of θ1 is 0.735 (predicted θ1 = 1),
whereas the estimate of θ2 equals −0.806 (predicted θ2 = −1). The estimated param-
eter values indicate that household fund deficits are covered mostly with the available
liquidity stock. In households a significant reduction in the level of net debt is ob-
served – the estimated value of θ0 is −0.739 (predicted θ0 = −1). Some accumulation
of liquid assets beyond the defined upper threshold may reflect situations that the
households commonly face, such as an accumulation of assets for home purchase, or
the lack of alternative financial investments (e.g., the accumulation of liquid assets by
the elderly after mortgage repayment). A partial reduction in net debt is also observed
for the tighter liquidity definition L
(0)
it , as θ0 = −0.356. Results for model (16), im-
plemented as a robustness check to the more data demanding model (15), support the
aforementioned conclusions.
The results obtained so far are broadly confirmed by the (more complex) setting of
(17), where discrete changes in short-term liquid assets resulting from debt repayment
and borrowing are considered. For specification (17), the estimation results support
(for both liquidity definitions) the hypothesis that there discrete positive changes in
short-term liquid assets when net debt increases. This result is consistent with a strictly
positive lump-sum cost associated with increasing net debt. For L
(1)
it , κ1 = −0.356,
whereas for L
(0)
it , κ1 = −0.224 (both coefficients are significant at the 1% level). The
existence of discrete reductions in short-term liquid assets associated with lowering the
level of net debt would be confirmed by a strictly positive estimate for the coefficient
κ0. However, for neither of the definitions of liquidity κ0 is positive, which indicates
that households do not associate reductions in net debt with lump-sum cost and, as a
result, do not pursue them in a discrete fashion.25 To summarise, the results of (17)
indicate that the discrete change l∗ at the lower liquidity threshold is greater than the
change (l − l∗) at the upper threshold. In other words, l∗ ∈ ( l
2
, l).
25We assume that the incremental financing structure decisions do not entail any “round trips”. In
other words, the annual deficit is implicitly interpreted as the supremum of all deficits between t− 1
and t− 1 + τ , where τ ∈ [0, 1]. However, this is just an approximation. In general an additional debt
issue occurring when −∆wit < li,t−1 (i.e., when the deficit can apparently be financed using internal
liquidity) does not automatically contradict our model. In fact, it may have happened that during
the course of the year the household ran into a deficit bigger than li,t−1 (which triggered a debt issue)
and only later it bounced back. The round trips potentially contribute to the estimated regression
coefficients in models (12)-(17) to be smaller (in absolute terms) than 1. Furthermore, without the
round trips, the sum of absolute values of κ0 and κ1 would equal
(
l − l∗)+ l∗ = l.
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Table 5 presents sensitivity results of regressions (15) and (17) with respect to the
upper bound of household liquidity, l, considering definition L
(1)
it . As mentioned before,
a grid search is performed to identify the best model fit for l ranging from 1 to 4 (with a
step size of 0.1). The best fit (the highest R2) is obtained with l = 2.6 for specification
(15) and with l = 3.1 for (17). (In both cases R2 is an inverted U-shaped function
of l.) For l = 3.1, both the sign and significance of κ0 improve. Still, only a partial
adjustment of liquidity to reduction of net debt is observed.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Having determined l associated with the best model fit and concluding that l∗ ∈
( l
2
, l), we are now in position to infer the magnitude of the transaction costs K and M ,
associated with increases and reductions in net debt, respectively. To do so, we use the
system of equations (4)-(7), and use the equation for the distribution mean to link l∗
and l with other model parameters. To eliminate the remaining degrees of freedom, we
adopt the estimate of income volatility of Dutch households of 0.197 obtained by Diaz-
Serrano (2005) and assume that r = δ = 0.04.26 Solving the model for l ∈ {2.6, 3.1}
and l∗ ∈ ( l
2
, l) indicates that the (perceived) lump-sum cost of increasing net debt, K,
varies from 0.10 to 0.21 (as a fraction of the average liquidity level) and is generally
much higher than the cost of reducing net debt, M , which ranges from 0.01 to 0.11. The
estimated costs K and M decrease with the assumed level of l∗ and K (M) decreases
(increases) with l. Furthermore, both costs increase with the assumed level of r and
decrease with σ.
To summarise the main part of the empirical analysis, our evidence supports to a
large extent the theoretical prediction that the presence of a financing deficit leads in
the first instance to the depletion of the stock of (internal) liquidity and only then is
followed by an increase in the level of net debt. Still, even with the most flexible model
specification, the relevant adjustment coefficients are smaller (in absolute values) than
1, which indicates that the financing hierarchy is followed only imperfectly. Throughout
Tables 3-5 we report confidence intervals of the estimated coefficients. The results of
the empirical analysis only partially support the hypothesis that the excess funds over
the (theoretically predicted) upper liquidity threshold are used to reduce the level of net
26To obtain an estimate of the actual volatility of liquidity process (1), we assume that there are
no transitory changes in consumption (see Appendix A) and that any shocks to income level fully
translate into shocks to the (unconstrained) liquidity level. Subsequently we scale income volatility
by the ratio of average liquidity to average income (0.56) to obtain the (standardised) estimate of σ.
Obviously, if transitory changes in consumption absorb a strictly positive fraction of shocks to income,
the actual σ will be lower and the estimates of the transaction costs consistent with it – higher.
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debt. Furthermore, we find evidence of a (perceived) significant lump-sum transaction
cost associated with increases in the level of net debt and of a substantially lower cost
associated with its reductions.
5.3 Analysis of households adopting sub-optimal financing de-
cisions
Previously we found that our financing hierarchy is only partially supported by the
data. This suggests that some households may be behaving sub-optimally. In this
section we try to identify households that behave sub-optimally and their character-
istics. We subsequently examine in what way their liquidity policy deviates from the
one predicted by our model.
As highlighted in the introduction, overdrafts constitute a very expensive source
of financing and they are therefore likely to be symptomatic of suboptimal financing
decisions. We therefore first analyse whether, and to what extent, households in our
sample rely on overdrafts. Subsequently we identify the characteristics of households
that use overdrafts using a probit and tobit model with, respectively, the presence (a
binary variable) and the monetary level of overdrafts as dependent variable. Finally, we
examine whether those household characteristics and the mere presence of overdrafts
help explaining household liquidity policy.27
We start off by analysing the occurrence and the level of overdrafts across house-
holds. As overdrafts constitute an expensive form of financing, which is likely incon-
sistent with the minimisation of financing costs, the analysis of overdrafts is useful
in two ways. Firstly, the empirical model of incremental financing decisions can be
extended to explicitly take into account the fact that some households use overdrafts.
If the presence of an overdraft is interpreted as irrational behaviour, such an extension
would allow us to test whether incremental financing decisions of households that use
overdrafts are further away from those predicted by our model. Secondly, identifying
the determinants of overdrafts is useful in selecting explanatory variables that are po-
tentially associated with less-than-rational financial decision making. We subsequently
test whether those variables indeed affect the incremental financing decisions.
For our initial sample of 9,957 observations, an overdraft is reported for 7.27% of
household-years. 4.41% of households report an overdraft every year and 87.38% never
resort to this source of financing. A simple analysis of variance (ANOVA) confirms
that the occurrence of an overdraft differs significantly between households. In other
words, household identity (household fixed effect) is a significant determinant of an
overdraft occurrence (F = 3.11 rejects the hypothesis that household fixed effects are
27We thank the anonymous referee for suggesting the analysis of overdrafts.
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not jointly significant at the 1% level). If we replace an overdraft occurrence with its
value and do an ANOVA on the overdraft levels, then there is no systematic difference
across households (F = 1.03 implies that the fixed effects are not significant at the
10% level). We conclude that the variation of overdraft levels cannot be explained by
the household fixed effects due to a high within variation of the overdraft levels.28
As overdrafts do not occur randomly across households, we investigate household
characteristics that explain the presence and the level of overdrafts. We predict that
financially more sophisticated households (cf. Campbell (2006)) will tend to use over-
drafts less often and to a lesser extent. Consequently, the probability and the mag-
nitude of an overdraft is expected to be negatively related to income (INC), wealth
(SIZE) and education (EDU), and positively related to leverage (LEV ), age (AGE),
unemployment (UNEMPL) and social benefits (BENEFIT ). We do not form expec-
tations regarding the direction of the effect of being self-employed (SELF ), pensioner
status (PENSION), the number of kids (KIDS), being a homeowner (OWNER) or
having an outstanding mortgage contract (MTG). The signs of the estimated coeffi-
cients of a probit model largely confirm our predictions. We find (see Table 6, column
3) that the probability of a household having an overdraft is positively related to LEV ,
SELF – but to a smaller magnitude than UNEMPL – as well as to BENEFIT and
KIDS. In turn, the probability of observing an overdraft is negatively influenced by
SIZE. All the results are significant at the 1% level with an exception of SIZE (5%)
and BENEFIT (10% level). Upon analysing the marginal effects, it can be concluded
that unemployment (UNEMPL) is the most highly economically significant determi-
nant of the probability of resorting to an overdraft facility. To complete the analysis,
we identify the determinants of the magnitude of overdrafts across households by es-
timating a tobit model. The expected magnitude of overdrafts is explained essentially
by the same variables as its probability, except that SIZE and BENEFIT lose their
statistical significance and AGE becomes statistically significant (see Table 6, column
5).
Since the use of overdraft accounts may be interpreted as a symptom of a sub-
optimal financing policy, we hypothesize that households using overdrafts are also
more likely to deviate from the optimal policy predicted by our model. Consequently,
we augment the empirical specification (17) by including interaction terms that cap-
ture the effect of overdraft use. Such an approach is equivalent to splitting the total
sample into two subsamples – with and without overdrafts – and allows us to test
the significance of the differences in key model coefficients and to compare discrete
changes related to increases/reductions in net debt. By comparing the incremental
28This finding can therefore be interpreted as the average level of an overdraft being the same (i.e.,
the actual level being drawn from the same distribution) across households.
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policies of households with and without overdrafts (see Table 7, column 2) we show
that the former are more likely to finance their deficit with debt even if short-term
liquidity is not fully exhausted (the coefficient of (−∆wit− li,t−1) is reduced by 0.375).
Moreover, households with overdrafts appear to borrow too little (and, as a result, too
frequently) once their short-term financial assets are actually fully exhausted (a posi-
tive coefficient of D1 ∗OV ERDRAFT , where OV ERDRAFT is a dummy equal to 1
if a household uses an overdraft facility and 0 otherwise, indicates a reduced magnitude
of the lump-sum borrowing). Those results imply that the behaviour of households us-
ing overdrafts indeed differs from other households’ and from the behaviour predicted
by our theoretical model.
Finally, we analyse whether the household characteristics that determine the pres-
ence and level of overdrafts also affect a household’s incremental financing policy. In
particular, we analyse the effect on liquidity policy of dummy variables linked to in-
come, total assets, leverage, age, benefit and unemployment. For all continuous vari-
ables of interest, the dummies are defined according to whether the relevant explana-
tory variable is above or below its median. Therefore, we define INCL and SIZEL,
as dummy variables equal to 1 if INC and SIZE, respectively, are below their median
and to 0 otherwise. Analogously, we define LEV H and AGEH as dummy variables
equal to 1 if LEV and AGE, respectively, are above their median and to 0 otherwise.29
We use again model (17) augmented with a range of interaction terms to capture the
effect of the variable of interest. The results of our tests support to a large extent the
hypothesis that the factors affecting the probability and level of overdrafts also affect
the incremental financing policy (see Table 7, columns 3-8). Borrowing before fully
exhausting liquidity is particularly common for households with high leverage – the
coefficient of (−∆wit− li,t−1)∗LEV Hit equals −0.052 (cf. column 5). Once short-term
liquid assets are exhausted, borrowing too little and too frequently occurs predomi-
nantly among households with low income, low assets and those who are unemployed –
the coefficient of D1 ∗X30 for X ∈ {INCL, SIZEL,UNEMPL} equals 0.106, 0.145,
and 0.292, respectively, which means that for these 3 categories the amount being
borrowed upon exhausting liquidity is smaller. Finally, elderly households and those
receiving social benefits appear not to adequately reduce their levels of net debt after
accumulating excess liquidity – the coefficient of D0 ∗X equals −0.512 for X = AGEH
and −0.603 for X = BENEFIT .
[Insert Tables 6 and 7 about here]
29Education and the number of kids are not significant determinants of the incremental financing
decisions, so we do not report them.
30Recall that D1 = 1 indicates that the deficit exceeds the amount of short-term liquid assets.
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6 Conclusions
We develop and test a theoretical model of household liquidity inspired by the stochas-
tic inventory management literature. According to our theoretical model, households
do not optimally increase net debt before short-term liquid assets are exhausted. If the
liquidity level hits zero, households take on enough debt to place liquid assets at a pos-
itive level. Furthermore, the model considers the possibility of a surplus of funds, and
predicts that net debt is optimally reduced above a certain upper liquidity threshold.
We test our model predictions using a panel data set of Dutch households. We
estimate the upper liquidity threshold at which a reduction in net debt occurs – by
partial repayment or investment in long-term financial assets. Five key liquidity deter-
minants, required for the implementation of our incremental financing decisions model,
are considered (we further extend the model for additional five determinants). House-
hold size and income are shown to affect positively the average level of household
liquidity. Household leverage appears to affect negatively the average level of liquid
asset holdings. Although more educated households take on less liquidity, the relation
is statistically significant only for the narrower definition of liquidity that does not in-
clude medium-term liquid assets. The significance of the age factor shows an increasing
importance of the precautionary motive for holding liquidity while moving through the
life cycle. Older people may also have a stronger preference towards cash to execute
financial transactions.
Concerning the incremental financing model, our empirical results for households
facing a deficit of funds are largely consistent with the theoretical predictions, and
are in line with a financing policy where households use the various financing options
according to a strict order of preference. Households use debt financing or deplete the
stock of long-term financial assets only after their liquidity is substantially reduced.
However, our prediction of debt repayment (or investment in long-term assets) for
the levels of liquidity above the derived upper threshold is only partially supported in
our sample, which indicates that the perceived benefits of reducing net debt may vary
widely across households. Furthermore, we find evidence of significant fixed transaction
costs associated with increases in the level of net debt, whereas decreases in the level
of net debt do not appear to entail costs of such a magnitude.
The finding that the financing hierarchy is only partially supported suggests that
some households may not be behaving optimally. First, elderly households and those
receiving benefits appear not to reduce adequately their level of net debt after ac-
cumulating excess liquidity. Second, some households have a significant amount of
short-term liquidity while having costly overdrafts. In fact, households having over-
drafts appear to borrow small amounts on a frequent basis, which indicates they ignore
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the fixed costs (fees) associated with this sub-optimal liquidity policy. In our data sam-
ple households with overdrafts tend to have few assets, high leverage and they are more
likely to be unemployed.
Our results have implications for regulators, lenders and policy makers. First, our
result that the implied transaction costs associated with increasing net debt are much
higher than those associated with reducing net debt suggests that policy measures
aimed at reducing frictions associated with the former may not only be necessary but
also more effective. Second, our finding that a small minority of poor and vulnerable
households rely too much and too frequently on the most costly forms of financing (such
as overdrafts) implies that there is clearly a need for providing those people with more
financial education, advice and protection. Some countries (like the US) have in the
wake of the recent crisis introduced legislation to protect consumers and adopted bills
that restrict overdraft services. Third, the fact that some households engage in costly
overdraft borrowing while holding substantial amounts of liquidity may be a symptom
of the cash management problem described in the introduction. If this sub-optimal
behaviour is indeed a result of the increased complexity (such as managing multiple
accounts) and volume of a household’s financial transactions then there seems to be
a need for a banking service that links a customer’s various accounts more efficiently
together. For example, a service that automatically transfers available funds from a
savings account to an account that risks being overdrawn could save customers a lot of
money in overdraft fees. Finally, our results show that some households (especially the
elderly) accumulate excessive amounts of short-term liquidity. We can only speculate
about the reasons for this. It might be because these households are more risk-averse
and therefore have a higher precautionary need for liquidity. They might prefer cash
transactions and attach a higher implied value to cash. Some might not be aware (or
not be bothered) that they are losing money by not investing in long-term financial
assets with a higher return. Others might have a very short horizon or perceive the
risk of liquidity shortage in the economy to be unreasonably high. If some of these
conjectures are true then boosting consumer confidence as well as maintaining trust
in the financial system may be important policy goals, particularly during recessions.
The excess liquidity in the hands of some households also suggests a potential source of
funds governments could tap into. In the wake of the credit crunch and sovereign debt
crisis some governments are considering to borrow more extensively from their own
citizens (and less for foreign investors) and to make government debt more attractive
by making it exempt from income tax, for example.
The absence of strong results concerning debt repayment and the transfer of liq-
uid assets to long-term assets are aspects certainly worth exploring in future research.
Different types of households may have different incentives to proceed with debt re-
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payment or to engage in long-term investments, and hence may adopt very different
liquidity policies. For example, pensioners having no debt may exhibit inertia in shift-
ing their investments, or households saving for home acquisition may not be keen on
investments involving high withdrawal penalties.
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A Derivation of the liquidity dynamics
The liquidity model of Section 2 is formally rationalized as follows. Assume that
a household has an infinite horizon (cf. Deaton (1993), Wang (2006)) and that its
cumulative income process follows an arithmetic Brownian motion
dYt = αdt+ σdzt, (A.1)
where α is the expected value of the instantaneous income flow and σ is its standard
deviation. Consequently, σdzt is interpreted as the difference between the expected
and realized income over interval dt. Such a model specification corresponds to income
being distributed normally in a discrete time setting.
In a perfect capital market, that is, with borrowing rate r equal to the lending rate
and no transaction costs, a household’s wealth Wt would have the following dynamics
dWt = dYt + rWtdt− ctdt = (α + rWt − ct) dt+ σdzt, (A.2)
where ct is the level of the household’s instantaneous consumption. Equation (A.2)
is interpreted as follows: the change in wealth over interval dt equals the sum of the
realized income stream and the capital gain on the existing wealth reduced by the
household’s consumption.
In a situation, in which borrowing (and, potentially, saving) is associated with
transaction costs, the household finds it optimal to maintain a liquidity balance. In
such a case, the dynamics of wealth is given by an equation similar to (A.2) but which
also takes into account the the transaction costs as well as the forgone interest on any
liquidity balance. Before deriving such an equation, let us first observe that the balance
sheet of the household can be written as Wt+Bt = St+Lt, where Bt, St, and Lt denote
the levels of borrowing, savings and liquidity, respectively. The instantaneous change
in the level of wealth can therefore be written as
dWt = [α + r(St −Bt)−KξK −MξM − ct] dt+ σdzt, (A.3)
where ξi, i ∈ {K,M} denotes an indicator function that has the value of 1 if the
fixed transaction cost i is incurred in interval dt and zero otherwise. Equation (A.3)
simply states that the change in wealth over interval dt equals the sum of the realized
instantaneous income stream and the interest on net savings reduced by any transaction
costs and the household’s consumption. Given that the balance sheet identity also holds
for changes in the levels
dWt + dBt = dSt + dLt, (A.4)
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the dynamics of stochastic process for liquidity is obtained by adding dBt− dSt to the
RHS of (A.3). Since
dSt = (rSt + ∆SξM) dt, and
dBt = (rBt + ∆BξK) dt,
where ∆S (∆B) is the lumpy saving (borrowing) made upon hitting the savings thresh-
old (exhausting liquidity), household liquidity Lt is governed by
dLt = [α + (∆B −K) ξK − (∆S +M) ξM − ct] dt+ σdzt, (A.5)
At this point, we need to impose a simplifying assumption that results in consump-
tion being constant over time. Namely, we assume that the household’s consumption
level is only a function of time and not of the state variable and that the household’s
discount rate δ is consistent with a constant consumption path under such a scenario.31
In such a case, liquidity follows the controlled arithmetic Brownian motion:
dLt = [α + (∆B −K) ξK − (∆S +M) ξM − c] dt+ σdzt
≡ [µ+ (∆B −K) ξK − (∆S +M) ξM ] dt+ σdzt. (A.6)
Equation (A.6) is therefore equivalent to (1) inside the control boundaries, that is,
when ξK = ξM = 0.
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Finally, to obtain µ, we determine the optimal consumption level, such that the
value of the household’s wealth and liquidity (that takes into accounts income and
consumption dynamics) is zero:
0 = W0 +G(L0;µ = α− c), (A.7)
with
G(L) ≡ F (L; δ = r) (A.8)
being the value of the liquidity (see (8)) with household discount rate δ replaced with
market rate r.
31If no such assumptions were made, one would need typically to maximise the integral of the dis-
counted instantaneous utilities of consumption subject to the wealth constraint. Such a maximisation
would be equivalent to solving the stochastic optimal control problem that would yield the optimal
instantaneous level of consumption as a function of two state variables Wt and Lt. As the resulting
Bellman equation would have a form of a partial differential equation, an analytical solution would
be unlikely.
32In fact, consumption can be allowed to partially reflect shocks to the income process Yt. In such
a case the stochastic component of the process governing the liquidity dynamics equals ρσdzt, with
ρ ∈ (0, 1).
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B Stochastic discount factors and annuity formulae
First, we observe that the present value of e1 received upon hitting an upper boundary
L before exhausting liquidity for a current level of liquidity equal to L is given by (cf.
Dixit (1993)):
Λ(L, 0;L) ≡ E [e−rTL1{TL<T0}|L] = e(L−L)( µσ2 +a) e2aL − 1e2aL − 1 , (B.1)









Similarly, we define the present value of e1 received upon when liquidity is exhausted
before L is hit as
Λ(L, 0;L) ≡ E [e−rT01{TL>T0}|L] = e−L( µσ2 +a) e2a(L−L) − 1e−2aL − 1 . (B.3)
Now, we can write (for simplicity, we drop the parameters of Λ(.) and Λ(.))

















where F (L∗) is simply obtained by substituting L∗ for L in (B.4). Consequently, F (L)
can be expressed as
















] Λ(L∗) [ (L−L∗)rδ −M]− Λ(L∗) [L∗rδ +M]
1− Λ(L∗)− Λ(L∗) ,
which is equivalent to (8) with
Θ(0, L;L) ≡ Λ(L) [1− Λ(L
∗)] + Λ(L∗)Λ(L)
1− Λ(L∗)− Λ(L∗) , and (B.6)
Θ(0, L;L) ≡ Λ(L)
[
1− Λ(L∗)]+ Λ(L)Λ(L∗)
1− Λ(L∗)− Λ(L∗) . (B.7)
C Stationary distribution
Below, we present the derivation of the density function of normalised liquidity, ϕ(l), for
the general case, that is with non-zero drift rate and positive transaction costs. Using
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the discrete approximation of the process (1), the steady-state distribution should
satisfy (see Dixit (1993))













with ∆l = σ
√
∆t. By using Taylor expansion of (C.1) and setting ∆t→ 0, one obtains
σ2
2
ϕ′′(l) = µϕ(l). (C.3)
The general solution is follows:
ϕ(l) = Al +B for µ = 0, (C.4)
= Ae
2µl
σ2 +B otherwise. (C.5)
The coefficients of the general solution differ across different intervals of the domain
of the controlled process l (in this case, there are two intervals, [0, l∗) and [l∗, l]), such
that (for µ 6= 0; for µ = 0 solution is obtained analogously)
ϕ(l) = A1e
2µl
σ2 +B1 for l ∈ [0, l∗), (C.6)
= A2e
2µl
σ2 +B2 for l ∈ [l∗, l]. (C.7)
First, as resetting is applied at barriers, ϕ(0) = ϕ(l) = 0. Second, the density function
is continuous at l∗. Finally, it has to integrate over its domain to 1.33 The resulting
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The mean of the distribution, E [l], is determined by integrating lϕ(l) over its domain.
33If K (M) is zero, ϕ(0) (ϕ(l)) is strictly positive and l∗ = 0 (l∗ = l). Therefore, there is only
one function specification to be determined, so two unknown constants are calculated using the two
remaining conditions, i.e., that ϕ(l) = 0 (ϕ(0) = 0) and ϕ(l) has to integrate over its domain to 1.
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Figure 1: Liquidity Management Policy
The figure presents the representation of the optimal liquidity management policy. Barrier L∗ corresponds to the








Figure 2: The Value of Household Liquidity
The figure presents the value of household liquidity, F (L), for the following set of parameters: K = 0.15, M = 0.05,
r = 0.05, δ = 0.05, µ = 0.04, and σ = 0.1. Barrier L∗ corresponds to the target liquidity level. Barrier L corresponds
to the liquidity level that triggers a reduction in net debt.










Figure 3: Stationary Distribution of Household Liquidity
The figure presents a stationary distribution of household normalised liquidity, ϕ(l), for the following set of parame-
ters: r = 0.05, δ = 0.04, σ = 0.1a, K = 0.15a, M = 0.05a, µ = 0.04a. The mean value, E [l] = 1, of the distribution
is represented with a dot. Parameter a = 2.95 is used for normalisation to ensure that the mean of the distribution
is 1.










Figure 4: Graphical Representation of Predicted Incremental Financing Decisions
The figure presents the hypothesized coefficients of the incremental financing decisions models (12)-(17) (Panels A-F, respectively). The
horizontal axis represents the deficit of funds (−∆w) and the vertical axis represents the reduction of short-term liquid assets (−∆l).
Consequently, the top-right quadrant of each panel represents a situation in which a household faces the deficit of funds and depletes its
short-term assets and the bottom-left quadrant corresponds to the surplus of funds. Discontinuous changes in −∆l in panel F correspond
to the resetting of the level of liquid assets to the target, l∗, associated with a reduction (the left-hand side of the graph) and an increase































































Table 1: Summary of Average Household Liquid Assets
The table presents liquid assets descriptives for the 9,957 Dutch households sample. The
values presented are in euros. Also, the total values and proportions of the asset categories
to liquidity variable L
(1)
it (cash and deposit accounts plus savings) and to total assets are
presented.
e %L(1)it %Assets
Cash and Checking Accounts, L
(0)
it 2,748.9 18.2% 1.4%
Savings
- Deposit Books 1,846.2 12.2% 0.9%
- Savings or Deposit Accounts 8,888.6 58.9% 4.5%
- Savings Plans 1,613.7 10.7% 0.8%
Total L
(1)
it 15,097.4 100.0% 7.6%
Other Financial Assets 12,212.1 6.1%
Total Debt 56,962.4 28.5%
Net Debt 44,750.3 22.4%
Total Assets 199,665.7 100.00%
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Table 2: Determinants of Household Expected Liquidity
The dependent variable is household liquid assets, measured as cash and deposit accounts (L
(0)
it ) and cash and deposit
accounts plus savings (L
(1)
it ). Regarding independent variables, SIZE is the logarithm of total assets; INC is the
total household net income; LEV is the ratio of total household debt to total household assets; AGE is the age of the
eldest member of the household; EDU is a dummy variable of value 1 when senior vocational education or university
education is present, and zero otherwise; PENSION is a dummy variable of value 1 when a pension is present, and
zero otherwise; OWNER is a dummy variable of value 1 when household owns house, and zero otherwise; and MTG
is a dummy variable of value 1 when household has mortgage debt, and zero otherwise; EMPL is a dummy variable
of value 1 when the head of the household is employed and zero otherwise; and SELF is a dummy variable of value 1
when the head of the household is self-employed and zero otherwise. The regression is estimated using OLS. Predicted
coefficient signs are presented in brackets. Outputs reported are estimated coefficients, standard errors of coefficients
(Std. Error), and significance level (p-value).
Model 1 Model 2
L
(0)
it Std. Error p-value Std. Error p-value
Constant -5110.12 509.23 0.00 -8440.88 743.42 0.00
SIZEit (+) 556.69 47.66 0.00 993.24 82.20 0.00
INCit (+/-) 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
LEVit (+/-) -1574.93 168.54 0.00 -1157.31 176.50 0.00
AGEit (+) 27.37 5.19 0.00 17.28 5.94 0.00
EDUit (+/-) -227.80 115.52 0.05 -244.66 113.70 0.03
PENSIONit (+) 539.45 271.83 0.05
OWNERit (-) -2108.39 329.25 0.00
MTGit (+/-) 159.09 264.55 0.55
EMPLit (+) 58.51 179.52 0.74




it Std. Error p-value Std. Error p-value
Constant -28922.88 1900.00 0.00 -53164.68 3647.24 0.00
SIZEit 3600.30 175.48 0.00 6482.40 385.53 0.00
INCit 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.00
LEVit -12694.67 736.93 0.00 -10298.05 758.08 0.00
AGEit 79.47 22.55 0.00 52.68 24.79 0.03
EDUit -451.06 462.14 0.33 -475.92 454.35 0.30
PENSIONit 2427.66 940.94 0.01
OWNERit -14433.11 1572.51 0.00
MTGit 1747.06 1082.20 0.11
EMPLit 1564.07 652.57 0.02
SELFit 2105.62 1688.13 0.21
R-Square 0.19 0.22
N. Obs. 9,957 9,957
N. Clusters 3,423 3,423
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Table 3: Incremental Financing Decisions Model for L
(0)
it
The table presents results for regressions (12)-(17) considering definition L
(0)
it : cash and deposit accounts. The dependent variable is −∆lit
for regression (12), and −∆lit − li,t−1 for (13)-(17). D0 is a dummy variable observing the value of 1 if −∆wit < −l + li,t−1, and D1
is a dummy variable observing the value of 1 if −∆wit > li,t−1. The regression is estimated using OLS. Outputs reported are estimated
coefficients, standard errors of coefficients (in italics), and confidence intervals at the 5% level. Statistical significance is indicated by ∗∗∗
for 1% level, ∗∗ for 5% level, and ∗ for 10% level.
Equation (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)
Constant -0.019 -0.880∗∗∗ -0.876∗∗∗ -0.557∗∗∗ -0.541∗∗∗ -0.423∗∗∗
0.012 0.019 0.021 0.020 0.022 0.027




min(−∆wit − li,t−1, 0) 0.017∗∗∗
0.002
(0.01,0.02)
(−∆wit − li,t−1) 0.017∗∗∗ 0.355∗∗∗ 0.697∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗
0.002 0.020 0.039 0.026
(0.01,0.02) (0.32,0.39) (0.62,0.77) (0.26,0.36)
max(−∆wit − li,t−1, 0) -0.018∗∗∗ -0.366∗∗∗ -0.708∗∗∗ -0.315∗∗∗
0.003 0.020 0.039 0.026
(-0.02,-0.01) (-0.41,-0.33) (-0.79,-0.63) (-0.37,-0.26)














R-Square 0.009 0.011 0.011 0.048 0.258 0.054
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Table 4: Incremental Financing Decisions Model for L
(1)
it
The table presents results for regressions (12)-(17) using definition L
(1)
it : cash and deposit accounts plus savings. The dependent variable
is −∆lit for regression (12), and −∆lit− li,t−1 for (13)-(17). D0 is a dummy variable observing the value of 1 if −∆wit < −l+ li,t−1, and
D1 is a dummy variable observing the value of 1 if −∆wit > li,t−1. The regression is estimated using OLS. Outputs reported are estimated
coefficients, standard errors of coefficients (in italics), and confidence intervals at the 5% level. Statistical significance is indicated by ∗∗∗
for 1% level, ∗∗ for 5% level, and ∗ for 10% level.
Equation (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)
Constant 0.012 -0.629∗∗∗ -0.612∗∗∗ -0.219∗∗∗ -0.296∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗
0.008 0.020 0.021 0.015 0.031 0.009




min(−∆wit − li,t−1, 0) 0.224∗∗∗
0.018
(0.19,0.26)
(−∆wit − li,t−1) 0.228∗∗∗ 0.735∗∗∗ 0.880∗∗∗ 0.761∗∗∗
0.018 0.027 0.048 0.013
(0.19,0.26) (0.68,0.79) (0.79,0.97) (0.74,0.79)
max(−∆wit − li,t−1, 0) -0.249∗∗∗ -0.806∗∗∗ -0.940∗∗∗ -0.798∗∗∗
0.021 0.030 0.052 0.014
(-0.29,-0.21) (-0.86,-0.74) (-1.04,-0.84) (-0.83,-0.77)














R-Square 0.092 0.168 0.170 0.302 0.551 0.316
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Table 5: Incremental Financing Decisions Model for Different Values of l
The table presents results for regressions (15) and (17) using definition L
(1)
it : cash and deposit accounts plus savings accounts, and different
values of l. l equals 2 for a symmetric distribution of liquidity. l = 2.6 maximises the fit of model (15). l = 3.1 maximises the fit of
model (17). The dependent variable is −∆lit − li,t−1. D0 is a dummy variable observing the value of 1 if −∆wit < −l + li,t−1, and D1
is a dummy variable observing the value of 1 if −∆wit > li,t−1. The regression is estimated using OLS. Outputs reported are estimated
coefficients, standard errors of coefficients (in italics), and confidence intervals at the 5% level. Statistical significance is indicated by ∗∗∗
for 1% level, ∗∗ for 5% level, and ∗ for 10% level.
Equation (15) (15) (15) (17) (17) (17)
l = 2 l = 2.6 l = 3.1 l = 2 l = 2.6 l = 3.1
Constant -0.219∗∗∗ -0.263∗∗∗ -0.305∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗ -0.158∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗
0.060 0.067 0.075 0.047 0.059 0.070
(-0.25,-0.19) (-0.29,-0.23) (-0.34,-0.27) (-0.15,-0.11) (-0.18,-0.14) (-0.19,-0.15)
(−∆wit − li,t−1) 0.735∗∗∗ 0.638∗∗∗ 0.569∗∗∗ 0.761∗∗∗ 0.715∗∗∗ 0.692∗∗∗
0.027 0.025 0.024 0.013 0.013 0.014
(0.68,0.79) (0.59,0.69) (0.52,0.62) (0.74,0.79) (0.69,0.74) (0.66,0.72)
max(−∆wit − li,t−1, 0) -0.806∗∗∗ -0.702∗∗∗ -0.628∗∗∗ -0.798∗∗∗ -0.752∗∗∗ -0.728∗∗∗
0.030 0.028 0.027 0.014 0.014 0.015
(-0.86,-0.75) (-0.76,-0.65) (-0.68,-0.58) (-0.83,-0.77) (-0.80,-0.72) (-0.76,-0.70)
min(−∆wit − li,t−1 + l, 0) -0.739∗∗∗ -0.700∗∗∗ -0.669∗∗∗ -0.795∗∗∗ -0.776∗∗∗ -0.737∗∗∗
0.060 0.067 0.075 0.047 0.059 0.070









R-Square 0.302 0.309 0.304 0.316 0.318 0.318
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Table 6: Determinants of the Probability and the Magnitude of Overdrafts
The table presents results of a probit model of the determinants of the probability
of an overdraft, and results of a tobit model of the determinants of the magnitude
of an overdraft. The second column presents the expected signs of model coeffi-
cients. All explanatory variables are defined in section 5.3. Outputs reported are
estimated coefficients, marginal effects, standard errors of coefficients (in italics),
and p-values.
Predicted Probit model Tobit model




SIZEit (-) -0.063 -0.008 -440.67
0.027 0.003 502.95
0.020 0.018 0.381
INCit (-) -0.000 -0.000 0.004
0.000 0.000 0.017
0.727 0.727 0.804
LEVit (+) 0.826 0.101 19580.19
0.073 0.010 1401.48
0.000 0.000 0.000
AGEit (+) 0.004 0.001 135.55
0.003 0.000 44.82
0.119 0.122 0.002
EDUit (-) 0.069 0.009 933.31
0.053 0.007 905.60
0.193 0.200 0.303
PENSIONit (+/-) -0.155 -0.018 -356.33
0.095 0.010 1583.03
0.104 0.076 0.822
OWNERit (+/-) 0.090 0.011 1470.95
0.127 0.015 2280.06
0.475 0.463 0.519
MTGit (+/-) 0.007 0.001 -1156.31
0.099 0.012 1662.88
0.945 0.945 0.487
SELFit (+/-) 0.335 0.052 7206.43
0.116 0.022 2135.49
0.004 0.018 0.001
UNEMPLit (+) 0.694 0.136 14042.26
0.180 0.050 2687.95
0.000 0.006 0.000
BENEFITit (+) 0.085 0.010 590.55
0.051 0.006 889.85
0.095 0.096 0.507





Table 7: Augmented Incremental Financing Decisions Model
The table presents results for augmented regression (17) using definition L
(1)
it : cash and deposit accounts plus savings. The dependent
variable is −∆lit− li,t−1. D0 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if −∆wit < −l+ li,t−1 and 0 otherwise, and D1 is a dummy variable equal to
1 if −∆wit > li,t−1 and 0 otherwise. Xit corresponds to the dummy variable stated at the top of each column. The regression is estimated
using OLS. Outputs reported are estimated coefficients, standard errors of coefficients (in italics), and confidence intervals at the 5% level.
Statistical significance is indicated by ∗∗∗ for 1% level, ∗∗ for 5% level, and ∗ for 10% level.
OV ERDRAFT INCL SIZEL LEVH AGEH BENEFIT UNEMPL
Constant -0.174∗∗∗ -0.194∗∗∗ -0.190∗∗∗ -0.150∗∗∗ -0.178∗∗∗ -0.226∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗
0.011 0.016 0.015 0.013 0.015 0.015 0.011
(-0.19,-0.15) (-0.23,-0.16) (-0.22,-0.16) (-0.18,-0.13) (-0.21,-0.15) (-0.26,-0.20) (-0.20,-0.15)
min(−∆wit − li,t−1 + l, 0) -0.745∗∗∗ -0.813∗∗∗ -0.879∗∗∗ -0.886∗∗∗ -0.649∗∗∗ -0.578∗∗∗ -0.735∗∗∗
0.073 0.063 0.030 0.031 0.102 0.105 0.071
(-0.89,-0.60) (-0.94,-0.69) (-0.94,-0.82) (-0.95,-0.83) (-0.85,-0.45) (-0.78,-0.37) (-0.87,-0.60)
(−∆wit − li,t−1) 0.706∗∗∗ 0.697∗∗∗ 0.698∗∗∗ 0.714∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 0.613∗∗∗ 0.693∗∗∗
0.014 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.020 0.014
(0.68,0.73) (0.66,0.73) (0.66,0.73) (0.68,0.75) (0.64,0.72) (0.57,0.65) (0.67,0.72)
max(−∆wit − li,t−1, 0) -0.741∗∗∗ -0.738∗∗∗ -0.730∗∗∗ -0.788∗∗∗ -0.715∗∗∗ -0.653∗∗∗ -0.729∗∗∗
0.015 0.019 0.019 0.035 0.022 0.021 0.015
(-0.77,-0.71) (-0.78,-0.70) (-0.77,-0.69) (-0.86,-0.72) (-0.76,-0.67) (-0.70,-0.61) (-0.76,-0.70)
D0,it 0.491
∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗ 0.052 0.457∗∗∗ 0.736∗∗∗ 0.753∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗∗
0.142 0.127 0.096 0.098 0.217 0.205 0.139
(0.21,0.77) (0.064,0.563) (-0.14,0.24) (0.27,0.65) (0.31,1.16) (0.35,1.16) (0.25,0.79)
D1,it -0.381
∗∗∗ -0.353∗∗∗ -0.365∗∗∗ -0.218∗∗∗ -0.327∗∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗ -0.316∗∗∗
0.027 0.035 0.035 0.040 0.031 0.030 0.025
(-0.43,-0.33) (-0.42,-0.28) (-0.43,-0.30) (-0.30,-0.14) (-0.39,-0.27) (-0.30,-0.19) (-0.36,-0.27)
min(−∆wit − li,t−1 + l, 0) ∗Xit 0.318∗∗∗ 0.182 0.337∗∗ 0.324∗∗ -0.222∗∗ -0.329∗∗ -0.210
0.112 0.144 0.138 0.135 0.109 0.129 0.185
(0.10,0.54) (-0.10,-0.46) (0.07,0.61) (0.06,0.59) (0.44,-0.01) (-0.58,-0.08) (-0.57,0.15)
(−∆wit − li,t−1) ∗Xit -0.375∗∗∗ -0.020 -0.023 -0.052∗ 0.018 0.155∗∗∗ -0.083
0.058 0.026 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.025 0.090
(-0.49,-0.26) (-0.07,0.03) (-0.08,0.03) (-0.11,0.00) (-0.03,0.07) (0.11,0.20) (-0.26,0.09)
max(−∆wit − li,t−1, 0) ∗Xit 0.388∗∗∗ 0.034 0.014 0.095∗∗ -0.027 -0.147∗∗∗ 0.091
0.060 0.029 0.029 0.041 0.030 0.028 0.093
(0.27,0.51) (-0.02,0.09) (-0.04,0.07) (0.01,0.18) (-0.09,0.03) (-0.20,-0.09) (-0.09,0.27)
D0,it ∗Xit -0.018 0.433 1.089∗∗∗ 0.043 -0.512∗∗ -0.603∗∗ -1.113
0.285 0.287 0.277 0.275 0.242 0.254 0.825
(-0.58,0.54) (-0.13,1.00) (0.55,1.63) (-0.50,0.58) (-0.99,-0.04) (-1.10,-0.10) (-2.73,0.50)
D1,it ∗Xit 0.417∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗ 0.039 -0.136∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗
0.057 0.047 0.047 0.050 0.049 0.048 0.081
(0.31,0.53) (0.01,0.20) (0.05,0.24) (-0.20,-0.00) (-0.06,0.13) (-0.23,-0.04) (0.13,0.45)
Xit -0.018 0.030 0.020 -0.055
∗∗ 0.008 0.100∗∗∗ 0.019
0.042 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.065
(-0.10,0.06) (-0.01,0.07) (-0.22,0.06) (-0.10,-0.01) (-0.03,0.05) (0.06,0.14) (-0.11,0.15)
R-Square 0.340 0.326 0.343 0.337 0.326 0.338 0.320
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